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Abstract Kinship and friendship are key human relationships. Increasingly, data suggest that 
people are not less altruistic toward friends than close kin. Some accounts suggest that 
psychologically we do not distinguish between them while, countering this, there is evidence 
that kinship provides a unique explanatory factor. Using the Implicit Association Test, we 
examined how people implicitly think about close friends versus close kin in three contexts. 
In Experiment 1, we examined generic attitudinal dispositions toward friends and family. In 
Experiment 2, attitude similarity as a marker of family and friends was examined, and in 
Experiments 3 and 4, strength of in-group membership for family and friends was examined. 
Findings show that differences exist in implicit cognitive associations toward family and 
friends. There is some evidence that people hold more positive general dispositions toward 
friends, associate attitude similarity more with friends, consider family as more representative 
of the ingroup than friends, but friends are more ingroup than distant kin. 
Keywords close relationships, cooperation, implicit association test, ingroup membership, 
attitude similarity 
  




Distinguishing family from friends: Implicit cognitive differences regarding general 




The success of the human species is fundamentally driven by the ability to 
cooperate—broadly defined—with a large number of conspecifics, a feature that sets humans 
apart from most other organisms. This cooperation, in turn, is founded on our extensive social 
relationships. Cooperation, although possible amongst strangers, is typically built on repeated 
interactions with the same individuals, building relationships. The study of human social 
relationships from an evolutionary perspective has historically partitioned them into kinships 
and friendships (Buss 2011; Curry et al. 2013; Hruschka 2010; Workman and Reader 2014), 
based on the two pillars of social evolution, inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton 1964) and 
reciprocal altruism theory (Trivers 1971). These frameworks, in turn, have shaped how we 
study those relationships. Essentially, whereas kinship has been seen as a reliable way for 
altruism to flourish, with a high probability of a shared trait that thus ensures benefits flow to 
the same genes (Dawkins 1976), friendship (usually contrasted to kinship, rather than as an 
orthogonal category; see Hruschka 2010 for further discussion) has been seen as needing 
more immediate exchanges to be viable. As such, friendships are thought to be more 
vulnerable to cheating, need more mechanisms to protect cooperative behavior, and thus 
should typically yield lower cooperation. In addition, recent approaches to friendship focus 
on direct-fitness benefit pathways, where friendships reflect underlying mutually beneficial 
arrangements, such as alliances (DeScioli and Kurzban 2011; Tooby and Cosmides 1996). As 
a result, kinship and friendship are not always examined alongside each other (e.g., DeScioli 
and Kurzban 2009; Korchmaros and Kenny 2001, 2006; Park and Schaller 2005), or a 




relatively anaemic version of a non-kin relationship is used (‘acquaintances’; Burnstein et al. 
1994; Lieberman and Linke 2007), which fails to robustly test friendship as a contrast to 
kinship.  
However, recent theoretical and empirical developments have overtaken this 
longstanding dichotomy. It is now widely recognized that inclusive fitness is driven by 
genetic similarity rather than the more narrow genealogical (consanguineous) relatedness 
(Lehmann et al. 2007) and empirical work shows that humans are capable of assorting into 
groups of non-related yet like-minded individuals (Hafen et al. 2011; O’Gorman et al. 2008; 
Rushton and Bons 2005; Sheldon et al. 2000). This places emphasis on assortative 
interactions between cooperators, prompting a focus on mechanisms for individuals to 
aggregate with cooperatively like-minded others. Kinship, however discerned, offers one 
mechanism to achieve this, but we can expect more nuanced mechanisms also. Not all 
relatives are equal in cooperative traits. 
A range of studies have simultaneously examined both relationship types, though 
results offer an unclear picture. While some studies show an overlap between close friends 
and close kin, particularly when focused on altruism measures (Ackerman et al. 2007; 
Essock-Vitale and McGuire 1985; Kruger 2003; Madsen et al. 2007; Stewart-Williams 2007), 
other studies suggest that kin are more privileged (Curry et al. 2013; Hackman et al. 2015; 
Kruger 2003; Rachlin and Jones 2008; Roberts and Dunbar 2011). A key distinction that 
emerges from these two sets of studies is that kinship, however measured, is predictive above 
and beyond other examined factors—most frequently emotional closeness—with altruism as 
the final outcome measure. 
The uniqueness of kinship, beyond other relationships, must be captured by other 
proximate psychological mechanisms that remain to be uncovered. In addition, recognition 
that consanguineous kinship need not be the only mode by which we would predict that non-




random associations of cooperating individuals occur (Hamilton 1975; Lehmann et al. 2007; 
Price 1972; Wilson and Wilson 2007) raises a need to focus on how different types of 
relationships may require different circumstances to allow cooperation to be viable. This, in 
turn, suggests that there is likely to be a benefit in examining broadly the proximate 
psychological mechanisms of how we develop and use relationships. In particular, it may be 
useful to examine how people cognitively parse these relationships. Much of the work on 
altruism within kinship and friendship has focused on behavioral outcome measures, either 
hypothetical (responding to a vignette) or retrospective self-report (based on past behavior 
during a window of time). While this approach has revealed patterns of helping that follow 
theoretical predictions for relatedness and relationship strength (friendships versus 
acquaintances), they have not typically examined how we cognitively process kinship and 
friendship. In particular, given the consistent findings that friendships are strong targets for 
altruism, often matching close relatives or even siblings, this raises the question of how do 
we think about friends versus family? We are all familiar with the expressions ‘she is like a 
sister’ directed toward a close friend and ‘she is my best friend’ in reference to a sibling. 
These expressions not only suggest that we distinguish between these two categories, but that 
each has meaningful characteristics. The question is, in what ways might we distinguish 
between these two categories that relate to evolutionary considerations? 
 
The present research 
 
Four experiments were conducted to examine how people may distinguish, or not, 
between friends and family. Throughout the four studies, we focused on participants’ implicit 
biases toward family and friends in relation to traits likely to be relevant to cooperation. 
Implicit biases reflect underlying dispositions that may be shaped by evolved preferences 




(Park and Schaller 2005), although they may also be influenced by experience and culture. 
Usefully, implicit measures reduce the role of executive cognitive control in responses, 
providing us with knowledge of the motivational orientations and basic attitudes held toward 
targets that shape behavior (Strack and Deutsch 2004). Comparisons of attitudes and 
behaviors show that these implicit attitudes can be important predictors (Conner et al. 2007; 
Greenwald et al. 2009; Nosek 2007; Nosek et al. 2007; Perugini et al. 2007, 2011). 
As an initial baseline of dispositions toward family and friends, we focused in the first 
experiment on measuring participants’ general attitudinal disposition toward kin and friends, 
with strangers forming a reference category. Although we might consider this measure to be a 
crude measure for an evolutionary approach, it offers both a parallel to typical domain-
general approaches from social psychology and a point of departure for the following three 
experiments. 
In the second experiment, we look at the relevance of attitude similarity as a kinship 
cue. Park and Schaller (2005) found that people associate someone who is attitudinally 
similar to themselves with close kin rather than strangers, and Park and Schaller argue that 
attitude similarity is a likely kinship cue, mirroring physical similarity. However, they did not 
examine attitude similarity and friendship, important because attitude similarity could just as 
easily be predicted to be a relevant friendship cue. Attitude similarity may be a valuable 
foundation for successful friendships, and similarity (homophily) is an established bias for 
friendships and other relationships (Hafen et al. 2011; McPherson et al. 2001; Rushton and 
Bons 2005). In addition, attitude similarity may be an important cue for the formation of 
alliances (DeScioli and Kurzban 2011), and one possible basis for mutually beneficial, direct-
fitness, cooperation (Tooby and Cosmides 1996; West et al. 2007). Thus, Experiment 2 
examines whether kinship, friendship, or both are associated with attitude similarity, relative 
to strangers, as a reference category.  




The third and fourth experiments examine whether kinship or friendship is more 
associated with ingroup membership. Like similarity, the ingroup bias is well established as a 
key facilitator of cooperative behavior (Yamagishi and Mifune 2008). In addition, group 
membership is conceptually relevant to the debate around inclusive fitness and multilevel 
selection, with group membership theorized as a key cue for facilitating altruistic behavior, 
independent of kinship (O’Gorman et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 2008). It is pertinent to how 
friendships, in particular, may operate, with alliances and communal sharing being premised 
on a common group membership. If group membership is related to assortative processes, 
then friendship might be expected to more strongly associate with ‘ingroup’ descriptors than 
kinship. Conversely, if group membership evolutionarily has been shaped by kinship 
associations then kinship should trump friendship in association strength with the ingroup 
category. Experiment 3 again uses strangers as a reference category, while Experiment 4 uses 
‘distant kin’, designed to expand on the findings of Experiment 3 and to place friendship 
within a broader kinship continuum. 
We used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al. 1998) to measure 
implicit attitudes. The IAT is an established measure of implicit cognition that is widely used 
in social psychology. Adopting the IAT both allowed us to replicate a previous methodology 
closely, and examine the implicit dispositions of participants which relate to less deliberative 
(planned) behavior. The IAT is a computerized task that requires participants to rapidly 
categorize target concepts (family, strangers, friends) and attribute concepts (pleasant, 
unpleasant1) using only two response keys. The IAT relies on the assumption that, if a target 
concept and an attribute concept are highly associated (e.g., pleasant and family), the task 
will be easier, and therefore quicker, when they share the same response key than when they 
																																								 																				
1	In the standard use of IATs, to measure people’s general attitudes toward a target category 
or object, the attribute pairing (capturing the valence of the attitude toward the target) is 
typically either pleasant/unpleasant or positive/negative. With either attribute pairing, the 
measures are seen as capturing basic implicit attitudes toward the targets.	




require a different response key. Based on response times, a relative measure of attitudes 




The purpose of this experiment was to determine a basic orientation for people’s 
attitudinal preferences, in line with standard social cognitive methodology, regarding family 
and close friends, with strangers as a reference category. This seems a useful grounding to 
begin from to better understand cognitive dispositions toward family and close friends. In 
contrast to most studies that examine dispositions of some kind toward kin and friends, we 
required participants to identify specific target individuals within each category to heighten 
the accessibility of actual specific attitudes. In addition, we focused on close family and close 
friends. In past studies where kinship is included as a category, the term is often narrowly 
operationalized along these lines (close family). For example, Lieberman et al. (2008) 
examine ‘category confusion’ (confusing members of different categories) for siblings. In 
contrast, friendship can often lack appropriately narrow operationalization. By having 







Eighty participants (64 females, 15 males; Age: M = 20.4; SD = 5.1; one participant 
did not provide sex or age) based at a northern UK university were recruited to the study in 




exchange for course credit. The experiment (and all following experiments) received 
institutional ethical approval. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants 




Implicit Association Test (IAT): There were three different IATs. The first IAT 
examined relative general attitudes toward family and friends, the second examined family 
versus strangers and the third examined friends versus strangers; the latter two IATs were 
counterbalanced for order across participants. Because the focus of the experiment was on 
family versus friends, and because the second and third IATs have greater equivalency 
(always having strangers as a comparison), the family/friends IAT was presented first across 
all participants. The exemplar words were obtained by having participants enter the names of 
five close family members, five close friends and five strangers (selected from the names list, 
see hereinafter) at the start of the computerized portion. We directed participants to choose 
family members “who are actually related to you” while selected friends “should not include 
relatives”. They were told that names for the strangers category “should be names for which 
you do not know anyone by that name as a friend, colleague or neighbor”. 
The pleasant attribute category words were peace, laughter, kind, fun, and sunny 
while the unpleasant category words were war, sadness, pain, filth, and death. Each IAT was 
presented using E-Prime experimental software (E-Prime 2.0 [Computer software] 2012) 
running on a Microsoft Windows compatible PC with a standard CRT display monitor with a 
refresh frequency of 75Hz. The IAT was set up as per the standard format (Greenwald et al. 
1998), with seven blocks of trials. The practice blocks had 20 trials per block, except for the 
reversed target-pairing practice block, which had 30 trials to mitigate the effects of the 




reversal (Nosek et al. 2005), while the critical test blocks had 60 trials per block. The IATs 
used a “built-in penalty” (Greenwald et al. 2003) for incorrect responses—participants would 
see a red X for 500ms and had to correct their response before they could continue to the next 
trial. The IAT was counterbalanced for the order of the target category-attribute pairings, 
such that half of the participants first had pleasant paired with one target category while the 
other half started with pleasant paired with the opposing category. Participants categorized 
target words using the S and K keys. 
Names list: The top 50 names for boys and girls in England and Wales for 2007 were 
provided to participants for selecting five stranger names. The list was obtained from the UK 
Office of National Statistics website (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-
tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-243640). Participants were instructed to choose five names 




Upon arrival, participants were led to the testing booth, and seated in front of a 
computer. They were provided with an overview of the study’s purpose (measuring attitudes 
toward family and friends) and procedure. After obtaining participation consent, participants 
were then provided with the names list and a pen to choose names. Once completed, the IAT 
testing script was initialized, the experimenter entered the assigned participant number, and 
then the participants entered their age, sex, and the names of family, friends and strangers, 
prompted by the program. On completion of the three IATs, the participants were debriefed 
and provided with their course credits.  
 
Results and Discussion 





IAT D-scores were calculated using the D1 algorithm (Greenwald et al. 2003), 
weighted for number of trials per block. Scores reflect the difference in response latency 
between possible pairings in each IAT, with positive scores indicating a positive association 
between pleasantness and the initial attribute category listed for each IAT. For the 
family/friends IAT, the D-scores ranged from .58 (indicating a positive bias to family) to -.60 
(indicating a positive bias to friends). For the family/strangers IAT, D-scores ranged from .80 
to -.45, while for the friends/strangers IAT, D-scores ranged from .81 to -.30. IAT reliability 
(as captured by internal consistency) was good (Nosek et al. 2007); calculated as per 
(Perugini et al. 2007): Family/friends IAT, α = .78, family/strangers IAT, α = .65, and 
friends/stranger IAT, α = .65. 
Participants showed a slightly stronger positive association between pleasantness and 
friends than pleasantness and family (M ± SD = -.02 ± .30) but this was not significant (one-
way t-test, t(79) = -.50, p = .618, r = .06). There was a significant, positive association for 
family over strangers (M ± SD = .20 ± .24; t(79) = 7.45, p < .001, r = .64), and a significant, 
positive association for friends over strangers (M ± SD = .28 ± .24; t(79) = 10.48, p < .001, r 
= .76). People do not seem to have more positive generic implicit attitudes toward family 
than toward close friends. However, D-scores were significantly larger for participants’ 
preference for friends over strangers than for family over strangers, t(79) = -2.73, p = .008, r 
= .29 (see Fig. 1). Thus, although the direct pairing of family and friends did not yield a 
significant difference in positive implicit attitudes, the IAT scores for the pairings of these 
categories with strangers suggest that people may have a slight but real bias in positive 
implicit attitudes toward friends than family, at least when contrasted to strangers.  
 
Experiment 2 





The finding that people do not distinguish between friends and family in general 
positivity reflects the considerable and extensive roles that both play in our social lives. 
However, such a broad-scale measure may mask differences that are more specific to 
distinguishing the two categories of relationship. One such specific factor is similarity. 
Physical similarity (‘phenotype matching’) has been shown to be a cue to kinship in humans 
and nonhumans (DeBruine et al. 2007), unsurprisingly as many physical features are 
heritable. Related to such findings, Park and Schaller (2005) have shown previously that an 
individual who is more attitudinally similar to the participant is more strongly associated with 
the category of family (versus stranger) than an individual who differs. However, there is a 
large literature that shows that similarity in characteristics such as race, sex, and age shape 
human social networks, and this effect extends to psychological traits such as attitudes and 
beliefs (Curry and Dunbar 2013; McPherson et al. 2001). Even more intriguing, perhaps, is 
the finding by Rushton and Bons (2005) that there appears to be a genetic bias toward 
homophily, and particularly for heritable characteristics, which suggests that psychological 
similarity could reflect not just family membership but shape humans’ broader social 
networks. Because Park and Schaller did not examine friendship, when it would seem a 
relevant additional category for attitude similarity, we modified Park and Schaller’s method 
to incorporate friends as a target category, alongside family and strangers. 
Although we sought to replicate Park and Schaller’s study, we did not do so fully. 
Principally, Park and Schaller had a second IAT to examine generic positivity toward family 
and strangers. They did so to show that their findings—that people associate those who are 
attitudinally similar with family—are not simply due to family being subsumed into the 
attribute positive, relative to strangers. Thus, instead of having a second IAT task as Park and 
Schaller did, we have relied on Experiment 1 as a basis for capturing generic implicit 




cognitive attitudes to family and friends, reducing the duration of the experiment for 
participants (the three-way comparison already requires three IATs). Comparison of results 
for the present experiment with those from Experiment 1 may indicate whether attitudes 






133 participants, based at two UK universities, completed the study in exchange for 
payment. Of these, four were dropped due to incorrect pairing of stimulus materials (target-
individual details) and IAT condition, one was dropped due to a lack of living family 
members, one due to being very slow at the tasks and one due to failure to complete the IATs. 
Data for 22 participants were discarded due to a programming error over-assigning 
participants to one counterbalanced condition while omitting two other conditions (these 
participants were replaced during the study such that numbers across conditions was 
balanced). This resulted in 104 participants being retained for analysis  (71 females, 33 




Names list: This was the same as in Experiment 1.  
Implicit Association Test (IAT): As in Experiment 1, there were three different IATs. 
The first IAT examined the perceived association between attitudinally similar and dissimilar 
individuals with family and friends, while the second and third IATs examined the association 




with family and strangers and with friends and strangers, counterbalanced for order across 
participants. Stimuli consisted of the names for individuals in each of the target relationship 
categories, as per Experiment 1, and the images of two attitudes-related individuals. The two 
individuals were assigned names (Carol and Elaine, as per Park and Schaller). The pairing of 
names to images was counterbalanced across participants, as was the paring of Carol and 
Elaine to being attitudinally similar or dissimilar. To reduce the otherwise extensive 
permutations due to counterbalancing, IAT pairings between family/strangers and the 
attitudes-related individuals were matched for friends/strangers, such that those participants 
for whom family was initially paired with the attitudinally-similar individual also had friends 
paired initially with the same individual, and vice versa. All other details were as in 
Experiment 1. 
Faith in Intuition instrument (FI): This is a subscale of the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (Epstein et al. 1996), and consists of 12 items. It is a widely used measure of an 
intuitive or instinctive disposition to behavior, contrasted with a more deliberative approach. 
It has a high internal consistency (α = .79 for the present experiment). Items include 
statements such as “I believe in trusting my hunches” and “I am quick to form impressions 
about people.” Although not a focus of the present research, this scale was included in the 
experiment to maintain methodological correspondence with Park and Schaller. 
Attitudes Scale: As for FI, this scale was not used in analysis but was included to 
maintain methodological correspondence with Park and Schaller (2005). It consists of five 
items, replicating that used by Park and Schaller (2005). The items cover such topics as birth 
control, bingo and the death penalty. In addition, three attitude items were presented to 
participants, for which participants were asked to predict how they thought the attitude-
related individuals (Carol and Elaine) would respond. The items covered the death penalty, 
reading and roller-coasters. 







Upon arrival, participants were led to the testing booth, and seated in front of the 
computer. They were provided with an overview of the study purpose and procedure. After 
obtaining participation consent, participants were provided with the names list and a pen to 
choose names, as well as the Faith in Intuition instrument, and the Attitudes Scale. On 
completion of those, participants were presented with a laminated sheet with images of, and 
fake details about, the two attitude-related individuals, Elaine and Carol, and the Attitudes-
prediction Scale. Participants were asked, for one of the individuals, to “imagine that she 
agrees with your attitudes toward separate roles for men and women, loud music, playing 
bingo, easy access to birth control, and being assertive” while participants were asked to 
imagine that the other target disagrees with the participants on the those attitude topics. These 
instructed pairings were counterbalanced for names and images. Once completed, the IAT 
testing script was initialized and the procedure followed that of Experiment 1, except that 
participants received a payment (UK£5) rather than course credit.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
IAT D-scores were calculated as per Experiment 1. Positive D-scores indicate a 
positive association between the initial attribute category in each IAT and the attitudinally 
similar individual. The D-scores ranged for the family/friends IAT from .87 to -.47, for the 
family/strangers IAT from .50 to -.54, and for the friends/strangers IAT from .76 to -.49. 
Reliability (as captured by internal consistency) was not as good for the family/friends IAT as 
in Experiment 1, but the other two IATs were comparable: Family/friends IAT, α = .55, 




family/strangers IAT, α = .64, and friends/strangers IAT, α = .64. That the family/friends IAT 
had lower internal consistency may suggest that participants had difficulties disentangling 
friends and family on the task. 
Examining the IAT D-scores in one-way t-tests, participants showed a slightly 
stronger positive association for the attitudinally-similar individual with family than with 
friends (M ± SD =.03 ± .25) but this was not significant (t(103) = 1.13, p = .262, r = .11), and 
a similarly non-significant positive association with family over strangers (M ± SD = .03 ± 
.21; t(103) = 1.37, p = .173, r = .13). However, participants showed a significantly more 
positive association (Bonferroni-adjusted α) for the attitudinally-similar individual with 
friends than with strangers (M ± SD = .07 ± .25; t(103) =2.63, p = .010, r = .25). People do 
not seem to associate an attitudinally similar individual with family over friends, or over 
strangers, but do associate such an individual with friends over strangers. That said, the D-
scores were not significantly different between the family/strangers IAT and the 
friends/strangers IAT (p = .203; see Fig. 2).  
The present findings expand upon (Park and Schaller 2005) findings, which were 
restricted to examining family versus strangers. Although the present study replicates the 
qualitative finding by Park and Schaller, of family more associated with attitude similarity 
than strangers, the effect was not actually significant. In addition, The narrow inclusive 
fitness approach by Park and Schaller would appear to have led to the omission of a key 
ecological component (friendship) that, in the present experiment, has a meaningful bearing 
on interpretation of findings for associations between an attitudinally similar individual to kin 
and strangers. 
Relating Experiment 2’s findings on implicit attitudinal differences to Experiment 1’s, 
whereas in Experiment 1 we found significant general positive biases toward both family 
over strangers and friends over strangers, in Experiment 2 we find that the lack of a domain-




general distinction does not carry over into a more specific cognitive appraisal. The failure to 
find a distinction when friends were pitted directly against family, yet finding a distinction 
between friends versus strangers and not between family versus strangers is somewhat 
surprising, but the IAT is a contrast task. It may be that participants do not conceptually 
distinguish between family and friends for attitude similarity when directly contrasted, 




We sought to examine whether the implicit biases found in Experiments 1 and 2 are 
due to the participant-generated friends set representing a better alignment for individuals’ 
interests (and thus aligned attitudes) than does kinship by examining association with ingroup 
membership. Group membership is a powerful and prevalent psychological categorization 
process (Buttelmann and Böhm 2014; Fu et al. 2012; Gaertner et al. 2006). People readily 
group others as ingroup or outgroup, and such categorization has impact on cooperation and 
discrimination, sufficiently powerful to scale to ethnic groups and contribute to the worst 
extremes of human behavior. This tendency to readily define group boundaries may have an 
evolved benefit, given that humans are a group-living species and cooperation is fundamental 
to our success, with a concomitant need to set boundaries for interaction partners (Brewer 
1999). The ingroup bias that typically emerges in this research is thus built on a different 
psychological foundation than homophily, though there is likely inevitable overlap in 
mechanisms. 
With regard to the present work, various clichés abound regarding choice of family 
and friends, and particularly that we can select friends, implying that the latter grouping can 
be in some way better (e.g., ‘You can choose your friends but you can’t choose your family’). 




This in turn would be predicted to set up more positive general attitudes toward friends 
(Experiment 1, albeit not a strong effect) and to provide an underlying reason for the stronger 
alignment of friends with an attitudinally similar individual than for family (Experiment 2, 
again, not a strong effect). This reasoning, along with the work showing that friendship may 
relate to alliance formation (DeScioli and Kurzban 2011), would predict that the 
categorization of friends as ingroup should be as strong as, or stronger than of kinship. In 
contrast, kinship consists of both a more familiar set of individuals, with a longer relationship 
duration, and one that has an evolutionarily definable and salient boundary (or set of 
expanding boundaries, with family and then layers of relatedness). Evolutionarily, kinship 







80 participants (46 females, 34 males; Age: M = 24.7; SD = 7.3) based at an eastern 




Names list: This was the same as in Experiment 1.  
Implicit Association Test (IAT): As in Experiment 1, there were three different IATs. 
The first IAT examined the perceived association between ingroup membership with family 
and friends; the second and third examined the association with family and strangers and with 




friends and strangers, counterbalanced across participants for order. The ingroup category 
(Us) words were we, us, and our while the outgroup category (Them) words were they, them, 




The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
IAT D-scores were calculated as per Experiment 1. Positive D-scores indicate a 
positive association between the initial attribute category listed for each IAT and the ingroup 
attribute category. The D-scores ranged for the family/friends IAT from .88 to -.61, for the 
family/strangers IAT from .97 to -.39, and for the friends/strangers IAT from .82 to -.38. 
Reliabilities (as captured by internal consistency) for the IATs in this experiment were better 
than the first two experiments: Family/friends IAT, α = .84, family/strangers IAT, α = .79, 
and friends/strangers IAT, α = .73.  
Examining the IAT D-scores in one-way t-tests, participants showed a significantly 
stronger positive association for ingroup membership with family than with friends (M ± SD 
=.23 ± .34, t(79) = 6.26, p < .001, r = .58), a significantly stronger positive association with 
family over strangers (M ± SD = .31 ± .29; t(79) = 9.55, p < .001, r = .73), and a significantly 
stronger positive association with friends than with strangers (M ± SD = .24 ± .28; t(79) = 
7.87, p < .001, r = .66). Participants associate ingroup with family more than they do friends 
or strangers, and with friends more than strangers. Moreover, D-scores differed in size for 
family/strangers versus friends/strangers (see Fig. 3), t(79) = 2.03, p = .046, r = .22. 




Family is clearly the primary ingroup over friends, and of course over strangers, contrasting 
with the findings for the previous experiments, where, if any category emerged as favoured, it 
was friends. The prediction that emerged from the first two experiments that friendship could 
be more strongly associated with ingroup is clearly countered by the data in Experiment 3. 
Instead, the results suggest that assortative grouping to form friendships does not supplant the 
value of family as an ingroup, at least at the cognitive appraisal level. This contrasts with the 




In light of the findings in Experiment 3, the question emerges as to whether the bias 
toward family over friends is restricted to the narrow kin group, family, or whether kinship 
more broadly trumps friendship. The former prediction results from a view that shared life 
history together and cultural factors (the role of family in society) contribute to ingroup 
membership. In contrast, an expectation for broader kinship, beyond family, to be more 
associated with ingroup membership than friendship is an expectation implicitly conveyed in 
some of the evolutionary psychology literature that has adopted a narrow inclusive fitness 
approach (based on sanguineous affiliation) and thus implies a cognitively less flexible 
mechanism. However, such a conclusion is less obviously so for the modern broader 
approach based on genetic similarity (and thus, selective assortative interactions, Rushton and 
Bons 2005). To examine these contrasts, Experiment 4 retained the methodology of 










57 participants (40 females, 17 males; Age: M = 26.6; SD = 12.7) based at an eastern 





 Implicit Association Test (IAT): Each IAT was presented using Millisecond Inquisit 4 
experimental software (Inquisit 4.0.6 [Computer software] 2014), which runs on both 
Microsoft Windows and Apple OS X. As in Experiment 1, there were three different IATs. 
The first IAT examined the perceived association between ingroup membership with family 
and friends, the second and third examined the association with family and relatives and with 
friends and relatives. All three IATs were counterbalanced across participants for order using 
an incomplete counterbalancing approach (this does not include every permutation but 
ensured that each IAT preceded each of the others and followed each of the others an equal 
number of times). The ingroup category (Us) exemplar words were we, us, and our while the 
outgroup category (Them) exemplar words were they, them, and their. For relatives exemplar 
stimuli, participants were asked to supply the names of five “known but distant relatives”. 
The purpose was to obtain kin from outside family, where possible, but still familiar. All 








Participants were tested in three differing methods: 35 participants completed the 
experiment with the experimenter in person (some in the lab, some at the participant’s home, 
hereafter ‘in person’), while the remainder (22) completed it in a setting of their choosing via 
online initiation of the experiment (Inquisit can run remotely via a download; hereafter, 
‘online’). For those completing the experiment in person, they were led to the testing booth, 
and seated in front of the testing computer. In all cases, instructions provided participants 
with an overview of the experiment’s purpose and procedure. After obtaining participation 
consent (via the software), participants were then instructed by the program to provide their 
age, sex, and names of family, friends and distant kin (“Please provide the names of five 
known but distant relatives”). Participants completed the three IATs. On completion of the 
IATs, the participants were provided with a debrief. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
IAT D-scores were calculated as per Experiment 1. Positive D-scores indicate a 
positive association between the initial attribute category listed for each IAT and the ingroup 
attribute category. The D-scores ranged for the family/friends IAT from .87 to -.87, for the 
family/relatives IAT from .89 to -.39, and for the friends/relatives IAT from .60 to -.65. 
Reliabilities (as captured by internal consistency) for the IATs in this experiment were 
strong: Family/friends IAT, α = .80, family/relatives IAT, α = .83, and friends/relatives IAT, 
α = .85.  
Examining the IAT D-scores in one-way t-tests, all comparisons returned significant 
effects (one marginal using a Bonferroni-adjusted α). Participants showed a stronger positive 
association for ingroup membership with family than with friends (M ± SD =.11 ± .31, t(56) 
= 2.68, p = .010, r = .34), a stronger positive association with family over relatives (M ± SD = 




.33 ± .29; t(56) = 8.66, p < .001, r = .76), and a stronger positive association with friends than 
with relatives (M ± SD = .11 ± .28; t(56) = 2.45, p = .018, r = .32). Participants significantly 
associate ingroup with family more than they do friends or relatives, and with friends more 
than relatives. Moreover, D-scores differed in size for family/relatives versus friends/relatives 
(see Fig. 4), t(56) = 4.40, p < .001, r = .51. 
Family is again clearly the primary ingroup over friends, in line with the findings for 
the previous experiment, and over relatives, novel if unsurprising. However, the question as 
to whether the bias toward kinship in Experiment 3 was restricted to a narrow kin group (i.e., 
family), or whether kinship more broadly trumps friendship, has been answered, with the 
results favoring the former option. This suggests that kinship per se is not a category that 




The main contribution sought with this study is to further develop our understanding 
of how we think about kin and friends, particularly in contrast to each other, as two key, but 
not usually strongly overlapping, social categories (at least, as we tend to define and use the 
terms). Existing research on kinship and friendship has tended to suffer from a dichotomized 
approach, driven by a historically divergent theoretical framework, as though in real life we 
interact with kin and friends in distinctly segregated ways. In reality, kin and friends make up 
a substantial component of our social network, competing for our attention and resources, 
and, with some individuals, falling into both camps. Moreover, over evolutionary timeframes, 
this overlap is likely to have been greater with reduced mobility (Walker 2014). At the same 
time, friendship and kinship may be orthogonal to each other, with membership of both 
categories possible (Hruschka 2010). The present study was an attempt to further our 




understanding of how we think about the two categories in relation to each other within 
specific, evolutionarily salient, cognitive domains that are known to impact on behavior: 
attitude similarity and ingroup membership.  
Experiment One adopted a standard social psychological approach, measuring 
participants’ generalized attitudes toward kin and friends (with strangers as a reference 
group). The results found that we do not strongly distinguish between close kin and friends, 
while both are distinguished from strangers, although friends more so. For evolutionarily 
minded readers, these results may seem uninteresting. However, aside from establishing that 
kinship is not, in general, cognitively privileged over friendship, it shows, in light of 
Experiments Two to Four, that apparent null effects for a domain-general approach (such as 
general positivity) may simply fail to capture more nuanced effects that exist and are 
uncovered when a phenomenon is studied with greater specificity (for example, if those 
effects are in opposition, yielding an overall null outcome). 
Experiment Two replicated and expanded upon Park and Schaller (2005). Park and 
Schaller found that people associate kin with an attitudinally similar person more strongly 
than a dissimilar person, and suggested that attitudes may serve as a kinship cue. However, 
inclusion of a close-friends category in the present study found a stronger effect for the 
contrast of friends with strangers than for family with strangers, failing to replicate the latter 
effect at a significant level. Friends and family were equally strongly associated with an 
attitudinally similar person, suggesting that both may typically share attitudes with 
participants, though the previously mentioned stronger similarity association with friends 
versus strangers suggests that attitude similarity may be a marker of friendship more readily 
than kinship. Unlike other possible cues of relatedness, attitude similarity does not appear to 
be a kin detection cue. The results here, contrasting with Park and Schaller, show the 
importance of not allowing a narrow theoretical framework to overly determine the approach 




to empirical research. While kin selection theory has long been considered the primary 
explanation for the structure of social relationships, there is always a need to challenge the 
robustness and applicability of any theory. 
Experiment Three represented a test of a second psychological process, ingroup bias, 
that is pertinent to how we are likely to think about family and friends. Ingroup bias is well 
studied in social psychology, but is generally studied with little attention to the impact of 
different relationships on the process. The third experiment found that the family category is 
clearly more strongly associated with our ingroup than is the friends category, though friends 
as a category is recognized as an ingroup relative to strangers. These results fit somewhat 
with results from Lieberman et al. (2008), insofar as kinship trumps friendship, but contrasts 
with findings by Lickel et al. (2000) who found that family and friends cluster as a single 
entitative category, relative to forty group-types (although family ranked slightly higher 
before clustering). Park et al. (2008) anticipated the results of Experiment Three, noting the 
likely relevance of group bias in their discussion of kinship recognition cues. They pointed 
out that as kin often lived in a single unit historically, outgroup membership would have been 
a strong predictor of non-kin. However, as kinship in our study so far has reflected immediate 
family, Experiment Three did not completely test this hypothesis. An alternative explanation 
for the results of Experiment Three may be that, while kin is perceived as a fundamental 
social group, friendships do not automatically constitute a unitary group, resulting in a failure 
to be evaluated as an ingroup vis-à-vis family. 
Experiment Four thus elaborated on the preceding one by substituting less immediate 
kin for strangers. Now, although family remained the category most strongly associated with 
ingroup membership, the friends category was more strongly associated with ingroup 
membership than relatives. This undermines any notion that kinship will trump non-kinship 
in a simplistic manner in our cognitive biases. It relates well with the findings from Stewart-




Williams (2007) and Essock-Vitale and McGuire (1985) that friends are more similar to close 
family (siblings) than are cousins for directed help. The results of Experiment Four suggest 
that shared life history, which typically results from close kinship, and cultural factors such as 
the role of family in society may weigh on determining ingroup membership, rather than a 
simple and broad notion of kinship detection. Such a conclusion is in keeping with an 
evolutionary approach to incest avoidance (Lieberman 2009; Lieberman et al. 2003), in 
which cues from the immediate environment (shared maternal care, co-residence) appear to 
be adaptively used to determine who to exclude as a sexual partner.  
As the study is relatively novel in approach, there remain a considerable number of 
unaddressed questions. In the present study we examined two possible cognitions that pertain 
to relationships (attitude similarity and ingroup membership). These two features both have 
relevance to our social networks, and cooperation, while, at the same time, they represent 
distinct processes (homophily and intergroup bias) may serve distinct evolutionary roles, as 
suggested by the different results. The results suggest that while similarity may be a marker 
of both friends and family, ingroup membership is more clearly delineated. Similarity does 
not generate group membership, at least in simplistic terms. It is worth noting, too, that the 
methodologies subtly differed in that for attitude similarity the question asked was whether 
someone who is similar to me is more associated with friends or family (rather than are 
family or friends more similar to me), whereas for group membership, it was a simpler 
question of whether family or friends or more associated with ingroup verbal markers. The 
finding for attitude similarity may not differ for the alternative question, but it is worth 
noting. 
There are other ways in which family and friends may be distinguished that are 
meaningful and impact on how those relationships function and translate to behavior, such as 
relationship durability, parental demands, and societal expectations. Another factor worthy of 




being examined is the impact of age of participants on category associations and related 
cognitions (our participants were primarily, though not exclusively, of typical college student 
age; would older participants have a similar pattern of results?). Inclusion of additional types 
of relationships, such as romantic relationships, may also broaden understanding of the place 
of each in our social networks. 
More focused examination of the specific levels of relatedness and closeness would 
also tighten up the findings, although it would be unlikely to radically modify them. In the 
present study, we did not obtain data for relatedness for chosen family and relatives, 
primarily to avoid lengthening the experiments, as establishing relatedness accurately 
requires detailed questioning, including distinctions between full, half, step and adopted 
siblings. Such data was not required for the methodology used in the present study, as the 
IAT operates at the category level. Thus, as long as participants were choosing those who 
they perceived as ‘close family’ then the IAT will capture associations between family and 
target cognitions, such as ingroup membership. Similarly, we left the ‘close’ in ‘close friends’ 
open to subjective definition. As the term is commonly used to describe emotional closeness 
in the context of friends, and rarely geographic, we consider it unlikely that errors occurred in 
this regard. Moreover, even if individuals vary in rated closeness for friends, it should not 
alter their entries for the friends category and the conclusions of the present study. 
Alternative methodologies are of course worth considering, given that any single 
approach risks idiosyncrasies. While the IAT is a well-established social cognitive tool, it is 
limited to examining associations between categories, and attempts to bypass deliberative 
cognition. It is not well understood exactly what shapes the associations that the IAT 
examines, and as such, other methodologies will help us to better tease apart the cognition 
that lies behind our social relationships. Another drawback of the IAT methodology is that 
because the IAT operates at the category level, it is not useful to examine individual 




exemplars. Alternatives exist—for example, the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (De Houwer 
2003)—that may help to examine the effects of specific relationships (e.g., siblings, parents, 
etc.) on individuals preferences and biases. In addition, it would be useful to examine 
whether the specifics of each individual’s relationships impact the results (e.g., a good versus 
bad relationship with a parent). While these issues become noise in our data, a more fine-
toothed approach may reveal a more precise understanding of the dynamics of human social 
relationships. Such an approach could revert to a self-report, explicit measures approach, thus 
also confirming the implicit measurement used in the present manuscript. Combining these 
measures with measures of cooperation would expand on extant findings in the literature that 




Research into our social relationships has often focused on non-relatives in social 
psychology, while typically focusing on either kin or non-kin in evolutionary psychology. In 
the present study, we contrasted how kin and friends are evaluated in three implicit cognitive 
domains, general positivity, attitude similarity and group membership, expanding beyond 
emotional closeness and self-reported altruism. We find that although participants do not 
distinguish between the two for general positivity, friends are slightly more strongly 
associated with attitude similarity, but group membership is more strongly associated with 
family, though with friends more than distant kin. The results overall suggest a nuanced 
cognition regarding kinship and friendship, although the present study represents only a 
beginning in this theoretically more integrated approach. 
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Fig. 1 Mean pleasantness IAT D-scores comparing family, friends, and strangers, with 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
Fig. 2 Mean attitude-similarity IAT D-scores comparing family, friends, and strangers, with 
95% confidence intervals.  
 
Fig. 3 Mean ingroup IAT D-scores comparing family, friends, and strangers, with 95% 
confidence intervals.  
	
Fig. 4 Mean ingroup IAT D-scores comparing family, friends, and distant relatives, with 95% 
confidence intervals.	
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